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1 Introduction
Over the last decade, in many if not all developed countries, monetary policy
has been the main instrument for managing the growth of aggregate demand
and inationary pressure. The chief monetary policy tool has been short-
term interest rates. The response to the recent nancial crisis has typically
been lowering the nominal interest rate to its zero lower bound. As monetary
policy loses its power at the zero lower bound, the conventional option of
cutting interest rates is no longer available. This raises the question of
whether scal policy is e¤ective in mitigating the e¤ects of the crisis.
Answering this question requires a model that can capture the key as-
pects of the crisis. As many noted, the realisation at the onset of the crisis
that many private nancial assets were of lower quality and therefore ac-
companied by higher default risks than previously assumed led to a ight
to liquid assets. At the height of the crisis, the markets for private nan-
cial assets essentially froze. The drop in the resaleability of private assets
diminished rmsability to raise funds and use their assets as collateral for
borrowing. The consequent decrease in investment led to substantial drops
in output and ination. To combat the recession, central banks lowered the
nominal interest rate to its zero lower bound, generating a liquidity trap.
This paper studies the e¤ectiveness of scal policy using the model pro-
posed by Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero and Kiyotaki (2011) (henceforth
DEFK). This model reformulates the state-of-the-art version of New Key-
nesian economics, as in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) (CEE)
and Smets and Wouters (2007) (SW), by incorporating the liquidity fric-
tions as described in Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) (KM). In the DEFK
model, the economy is populated with a large number of identical house-
holds. Each household can save in two types of nancial assets: government
bonds and private equity. Government bonds are liquid, while private assets
are not.1 During each period, a randomly chosen fraction of household mem-
bers becomes entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs have the opportunity to invest
1As noted by DEFK, private equity has a broad denition in this model. It can be
interpreted as privately issued paper such as commercial paper, bank loans, mortgages,
and so on.
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in new capital, which gives a better return than government bonds or private
equity. Although investment opportunities are attractive, entrepreneurs are
liquidity constrained: Entrepreneurs can borrow by issuing new equity, but
the amount that they can issue in each period is limited; Private equity is
illiquid, so entrepreneurs can sell only up to a certain portion of their equity
holdings in each period. The rest of the household members are workers.
They do not have the opportunity to invest in new capital and are not liq-
uidity constrained. They work, consume and save by holding government
bonds and private equity. Other features of the model are standard New
Keynesian. Firms and workers enjoy some degree of monopoly power; prices
and wages remain unchanged, on average, for several months. The central
bank sets the interest rate following a Taylor-style rule. The presence of liq-
uidity frictions in the DEFK model allows us to simulate the recent nancial
crisis. Comparison of the empirical data and the models projections shows
that the DEFK model performs well in explaining the responses of the key
macroeconomic variables to the recent crisis.2
We introduce a role for government spending in the DEFK model. In
our experiments, we consider two di¤erent kinds of scal expansion: a gov-
ernment spending rise and a tax cut. In the former case, the government
buys more goods and services from rms and therefore stimulates aggregate
demand. In the latter case, the government carries out a lump-sum tax cut
which in practice resembles a lump-sum transfer to households. In both
cases, we assume that the scal expansion is nanced mainly by bonds - the
government issues bonds to households to be repaid by tax rises at a later
date.
In our study, we consider two scenarios. In the rst scenario, we look at
the government spending multiplier using the version of the DEFK model
in normal times (i.e., without liquidity shocks) when the zero lower bound
on the nominal interest rate does not bind. We nd that the size of the
multiplier is much larger than that suggested by a standard DSGE model
2DEFK use their model to examine the e¤ectiveness of quantitative easing and nd it
to be an e¤ective policy. Ajello (2010), Dri¢ ll and Miller (2011) and Shi (2015) also use
the DEFK/KM framework to study the current nancial crisis.
3
without nancial frictions. The cumulative government spending multiplier
obtained using the DEFK model is 1.6, while the one in the standard model
is 0.55. The intuition for this result is as follows. In both models, an in-
crease in government spending leads to higher future tax burdens and rises
in the real interest rate. Both of these factors cause households to postpone
consumption and increase their government bond holdings. In the standard
model, investment falls since the higher real interest rate on bonds increases
the opportunity cost of investing in physical capital. The government spend-
ing multiplier is thus smaller than 1. In the DEFK model, the multiplier
is large because, unlike in the standard model, a bond-nanced government
spending expansion improves liquidity by increasing the proportion of liq-
uid assets in householdswealth, which in turn allows liquidity constrained
entrepreneurs to increase investment. Increased economic activity then in-
creases private consumption, leading to a large multiplier.
In the second scenario, we look at the government spending multiplier
in a liquidity crisis caused by a fall in the resaleability of private equity,
in which case the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate becomes
binding.3 We nd that, in the DEFK model and in the standard model, the
government spending multiplier is much larger in a liquidity crisis than in
normal times. Moreover, we nd that in the crisis scenario the multiplier
in the DEFK model is still larger than that in the standard model. The
government spending multiplier suggested by the DEFK model is larger
than 2 in crisis times. At the zero lower bound, an increase in government
spending creates inationary pressures which decrease the real interest rate
and stimulate consumption. In the DEFK model, the stimulative e¤ect of
scal policy is even larger because the multiplier e¤ect applies to both con-
sumption and investment. Holding the persistence of government spending
3Erceg and Linde (2012) criticise the assumption of an exogenous zero-bound condition
in the study of the scal multiplier. They point out that, as an increase in government
expenditure may help push the economy out of a liquidity trap, the multiplier will be
smaller if the zero-bound condition is endogenous. Mertens and Ravn (2010) warn that
the value of the multiplier is sensitive to the type of shock that drives the economy into a
liquidity trap. To address these issues, we examine the scal multipliers using the DEFK
model, in which the liquidity trap is endogenously caused by a nancial crisis.
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constant, we show that the value of the government spending multiplier in
the standard model tends to decrease as the crisis prolongs, whereas in the
DEFK model it increases. Under the crisis scenario, we also examine the
e¤ects of the scal interventions in the US under the 2009 American Re-
covery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). Our ndings suggest that the scal
interventions may have prevented a deeper recession.
We then study the tax multiplier in both the normal-times and the cri-
sis scenarios. Our results obtained with the DEFK model show that the
tax multiplier is smaller than the government spending multiplier. A cut
in lump-sum taxes reduces the revenue of the government, causing it to in-
crease bond issues. This improves the private sectors liquidity and leads
to increases in investment, consumption and output. The tax cut is less
e¤ective than government spending in stimulating output since it does not
directly generate aggregate demand. This result suggests that both an in-
crease in aggregate demand and an improvement in liquidity are important
in stimulating economic activity.
Finally, we test the sensitivity of the spending and the tax multipliers to
the steady-state debt-to-output ratio. Our results suggest that scal policy
is more e¤ective in stimulating output when the initial debt-to-GDP ratio is
low. The policy implication is that containing the debt level during normal
times would allow governments to achieve more e¤ective results of scal
stimulus in times of crisis, when such results are most needed.
Before describing the model, let us briey review the literature on this
topic.4 Most of the theoretical discussions on the e¤ectiveness of scal policy
have been based on the CEE/SW model (see, for example, Bilbiie, Monacelli
and Perotti (2014), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011), Cogan et
al. (2010) and Woodford (2011)). The CEE/SW model assumes frictionless
nancial markets and therefore cannot provide a detailed account of the
4The majority of empirical research in this area seems to suggest that scal policy is
not e¤ective and that an increase in government spending does not have a signicant e¤ect
on the economy (see, for example, Hall (2009), Ramey (2011b) and references therein).
The government spending multiplier is typically estimated to lie between 0.6 and 1.2.
However, some recent empirical studies show that the scal multiplier is much larger
during a recession (see, for example, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012)).
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recent crisis. Our paper belongs to the recent literature that examines the
e¤ectiveness of scal policy in the presence of nancial frictions. Impor-
tant papers in this literature include Bilbiie, Monacelli and Perotti (2013),
Carrillo and Poilly (2013), Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) and Fernandez-
Villaverde (2010). Bilbiie et al. (2013) and Eggertsson and Krugman (2012)
use a Borrower-Saver model in which some agentsability to optimise in-
tertemporally is limited by the borrowing constraints that they face. Both
studies suggest that scal policy is more e¤ective in stimulating output in the
presence of borrowing constraints, although the value of the spending/tax
multiplier depends heavily on the share of debt-constrained borrowers in the
economy. Carrillo and Poilly (2013) and Fernandez-Villaverde (2010), on the
other hand, use models that accommodate the form of liquidity frictions sug-
gested by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) (BGG), in which rms
ability to borrow is determined by the market value of their net worth.
Fernandez-Villaverde (2010) nds that the value of the spending multiplier
is around one upon impact and falls quickly thereafter. His multiplier is
larger than that suggested by standard models but smaller than ours.5 Car-
rillo and Poilly (2013) nd that nancial frictions have a greater contribution
to the value of the multiplier in a liquidity trap than in normal times. Their
cumulative multiplier in the liquidity-trap case is 3.7,6 which is almost twice
as large as ours. Our paper di¤ers from previous studies in the way that
nancial frictions are introduced. While the Borrower-Saver model and the
BGG model focus on borrowing constraints, the DEFK model accounts for
both borrowing constraints and asset resaleability constraints.7 To generate
a liquidity trap, Carrillo and Poilly (2013) assume that the capital returns
perceived by entrepreneurs are a¤ected by a risk-premium shock similar to
5As shown later in our results, although our post-shock impact multiplier in normal
times is smaller than 1, it increases gradually over time. As a result, the cumulative
multiplier we obtain (1.6) is substantially larger than 1.
6See Table 1 in the online appendix that can be found as supplementary material at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2013.01.004.
7Although the DEFK model focuses mainly on resaleability constraints, borrowing
constraints also play a signicant role in generating large scal multipliers. If there are
no borrowing constraints, as discussed in KM, new investment could be wholly nanced
by issuing new equity. In that case, shocks to resaleability would have negligible impacts.
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the one in Smets and Wouters (2007). Since the empirical relevance of this
kind of shock is uncertain (see Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2009) for a
detailed discussion), the DEFK model o¤ers an alternative way to generate
a liquidity-trap crisis. Despite the di¤erence in the approach, our ndings
are in line with these studies, strengthening the conclusion that the scal
multiplier is larger under imperfect nancial markets.
The presence of asset resaleability constraints in the DEFK model has
new implications for the transmission mechanism of scal policy. In the
Borrower-Saver model or the BGG model, scal expansion works by increas-
ing debtorsincome or net worth, hence relaxing their nancing constraints.
In the DEFK model, by contrast, scal expansion works by improving en-
trepreneursliquidity since government bonds are more liquid than private
assets. There have been papers in the theoretical literature that propose
the liquidity role of government bonds (see, for example, Woodford (1990),
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998)). In the
empirical literature, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) suggest
that the low yield on US Treasuries is due to the safety and liquidity that
they o¤er. Using US data for the period from 1926 to 2008, these authors
nd that the yield spread between Treasury bonds and less liquid assets
reduces when the supply of Treasury bonds is abundant, showing evidence
of an improvement in market liquidity during such times.
2 The Model with Liquidity Frictions
This section describes the special features of our model. The model that we
use is proposed by DEFK, in which households are liquidity constrained and
face shocks that tighten their liquidity. Government expenditure is absent
in the original DEFK model. We introduce a role for government spending
in the model for our study of the scal multiplier.
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2.1 Households
The economy consists of a continuum of identical households. Each house-
hold consists of a continuum of members j 2 [0; 1]. In each period, mem-
bers have an i.i.d. opportunity { to invest in capital. Household mem-
bers (j 2 [0;{)) who receive the opportunity to invest are entrepreneurs,
whereas those who do not (j 2 [{; 1]) are workers. Entrepreneurs invest
and do not work. Workers work to earn labour income. Each households
assets are divided equally among its own members at the beginning of each
period. After members nd out whether they are entrepreneurs or workers,
households cannot reallocate their assets. If any household member needs
extra funds, they need to obtain them from external sources. At the end
of each period, household members return all their assets plus any income
they earn during the period to the household.8
The representative households utility depends on the aggregate con-
sumption Ct 
R 1
0 Ct (j) dj as consumption goods are jointly utilised by its
members. Each member seeks to maximise the utility of the household as a
whole, which is given by:
Et
1X
s=t
s t

C1 s
1    
1
1 + 
Z 1
{
Hs (j)
1+ dj

, (1)
where  is the discount factor,  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion,
and  is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply. Labour supply for
entrepreneurs is zero (i.e. Ht (j) = 0). Each period, household members
choose optimally among non-durable consumption, saving in bonds or eq-
uity and, if they are entrepreneurs, investment in capital. Details of their
saving and investment options are as follows: (i) Entrepreneurs have the
opportunity to invest in new capital (It) which costs pIt per unit. Each
unit of capital goods generates a rental income of rkt , depreciates at a rate
of  and has a market value of qt. The return on new capital is therefore
8The assumption that entrepreneurs and workers belong to the same household is based
on Shi (2015). This is di¤erent from the setting in KM (2008), in which entrepreneurs and
workers are two separate entities. As noted by DEFK, adopting this assumption increases
the exibility of the model to incorporate various modications for sensitivity analysis.
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rkt+1+(1 )qt+1
pIt
. Entrepreneurs can borrow to invest. Borrowing is in the form
of issuing equity, N It , that entitles the holder to claim the future returns on
the underlying capital goods. (ii) Household members can save in risk-free
government bonds, Lt, which have a unit face value and pay a gross nominal
interest rate, Rt, over the period t to t+1. (iii) Household members can also
purchase the equity issued by other households, NOt , at the market price of
qt. As equity holders receive income from the underlying capital goods, the
return on equity over t to t+1 is
rkt+1+(1 )qt+1
qt
. The households net equity
is dened as Nt  NOt +Kt  N It .
At the beginning of each period, the household also receives dividends
from intermediate-goods and capital-goods rms amounting to Dt and DKt
respectively. The household pays lump-sum taxes,  t, to the government.
The intertemporal budget constraint is:9
Ct + p
I
t It + qt [Nt   It] + Lt =
h
rkt + (1  ) qt
i
Nt 1 +
Rt 1
t
Lt 1
+
Z 1
{
Wt (j)
Pt
Ht (j) dj +Dt +D
K
t    t(2)
where t  PtPt 1 is the gross ination rate at t and Wt (j) is the nominal
wage earned by type-j workers. Entrepreneurs and workers face di¤erent
problems as explained below.
2.1.1 Entrepreneurs
In the steady state and the post-shock equilibria, the market price of eq-
uity qt is always greater than the investment cost of new capital pIt . Hence,
the return on new capital is strictly greater than those on equity and on
government bonds. Entrepreneurs are rational and would invest all their
available resources in new capital. To spare more funds for investment,
entrepreneurs do not spend on consumption goods, i.e., Ct(j) = 0 for
9 In this paper, stock variables at t show the amounts of stocks at the end of the period.
This is di¤erent from the timing convention in DEFK, where the stock variables at t are
dened as the amounts at the beginning of the period.
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j 2 [0;{). They would also sell all their bond holdings so that Lt(j) = 0
for j 2 [0;{).10 There are, however, borrowing and resaleability constraints
if entrepreneurs want to obtain funds through equity: Entrepreneurs can
borrow by issuing equity of only up to  2 (0; 1) fraction of their new in-
vestment. Also, in each period, entrepreneurs can sell only up to t 2 (0; 1)
fraction of their net equity holdings. Since borrowing and resaleability con-
straints are both binding, entrepreneurs net equity evolves according to
Nt(j) = (1   t) (1  )Nt 1(j) + (1   )It(j). Combining entrepreneurs
rst order conditions for Ct(j), Lt(j) and Nt(j) with the intertemporal bud-
get constraint (2) gives the aggregate investment function:
It =
Z {
0
It (j) dj = {

rkt + (1  ) qtt

Nt 1 +
Rt 1
t
Lt 1 +Dt +DKt    t
pIt   qt
(3)
2.1.2 Workers
Workersconsumption and saving decisions can be derived by considering
the household as a whole. Workers choose Ct, Lt and Nt to maximise the
households utility (1), subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (2)
and the investment decision of entrepreneurs (3). The rst-order conditions
give the respective Euler equations for bonds and equity:
C t = Et
(
C t+1
"
Rt
t+1
+
{
 
qt+1   pIt+1

pIt+1   qt+1
Rt
t+1
#)
(4)
C t = Et
8<:C t+1
24 rkt+1+(1 )qt+1qt
+
{(qt+1 pIt+1)
pIt+1 qt+1
rkt+1+(1 )qt+1t+1
qt
359=; (5)
These Euler equations reduce to the standard ones when { = 0. In the
DEFK model, there is a premium on top of the standard returns on bonds
and equity because households are liquidity-constrained. By choosing to
10Following DEFK, we assume that entrepreneurs cannot take negative positions in
their government bond holdings.
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hold one extra unit of government bonds at t instead of consumption, the
bond-holder gains Rtt+1 extra units of liquidity at t+1: Similarly, by choosing
to hold one extra unit of equity at t instead of spending, the equity-holder
receives
rkt+1+(1 )qt+1t+1
qt
extra units of liquidity at t + 1. The extra liq-
uidity allows them to prot from an investment opportunity if they become
entrepreneurs at t+ 1.
2.2 Government Policies
The governments budget constraint is:
Gt +
Rt 1Lt 1
t
=  t + Lt, (6)
In addition, the scal rule requires that:
 t    =  

Rt 1Lt 1
t
  RL


+ t , (7)
where the policy parameter   > 0. Variables without the time subscript
represent steady-state values. The value of   is low to reect that the
adjustment on taxes is slow compared to bond issue, so the government
has to obtain funds for scal expansion mainly by issuing bonds. t is an
exogenous tax shock.
The central bank adopts a generalised Taylor rule similar to the one in
SW (2007):
Rt = max
8<:RRt 1
 
R
 
t

Yt
Y
 Y!1 R  Yt
Yt 1
 Y
; 1
9=; (8)
where R is the interest rate smoothing parameter,   > 1; and  Y and
 Y are both between zero and one. The zero lower bound on the nominal
interest rate requires that Rt cannot be lower than 1.11 The gross real
interest rate is obtained by rt = RtEt(t+1) .
11 In the DEFK model, unlike in the standard model, the zero lower bound is not a
constraint but an equilibrium condition. Households in this model are willing to hold
bonds even if the nominal interest rate is negative because of the liquidity advantage that
bonds provide.
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2.3 Equilibrium and Solution Strategy
Other assumptions in the model are standard New Keynesian. In this paper,
we study the policy multipliers for a government spending expansion and a
lump-sum tax cut respectively. A government spending shock is measured as
a percentage of GDP, bGt  Gt GY . We assume an AR(1) evolution of govern-
ment spending: bGt = G bGt 1 + eGt , where G is the persistence parameter.
Similarly, a tax shock t to the scal rule (7) is also measured as a percent-
age of GDP and evolves according to an AR(1) process: t = 

t 1 + et .
Using the DEFK model, we study the scal multiplier under two scenarios:
in normal times and in times of a liquidity crisis. We dene normal times
as the times when the scal policy shock is the only source of disturbances,
whereas crisis times are when the economy is also struck by a liquidity shock.
A liquidity shock refers to a sudden drop of private assetsresaleability, ex-
pressed by a fall in the value of the resaleability parameter t from steady
state. Evolution of bt  t  follows bt = et < 0. In a liquidity crisis, large
falls in output and ination push the nominal interest rate to its zero lower
bound.
We retain the nonlinear nature of the model in our simulation experi-
ments. Since the competitive equilibria achieved following a liquidity shock
can stay far away from the steady state for a long time, applying log-
linearisation may lead to inaccurate results. Given the fact that, as it was
under the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), the
path of government spending is often expected for some periods after its
announcement, we carry out deterministic simulations using Dynare based
on the assumption of perfect foresight. Under this assumption, agents have
perfect foresight on the paths of shocks and expect with certainty that no
subsequent shock will follow in the future. In a deterministic simulation,
Dynare generates the responses of variables from the realisation of a shock
in the rst period until the economy goes back to the steady state. To
achieve this, Dynare solves a nonlinear system of simultaneous equations
for every period by adopting a Newton-type method. We refer interested
readers to Adjemian et al. (2011) for a detailed description of the algorithm.
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Unlike DEFK, who assume that the resaleability parameter bt follows a
two-state Markov process, we assume that bt stays below zero after a liquid-
ity shock for a deterministic number of periods. In view of the ndings by
Carlstrom, Fuerst and Paustian (2012), our main conclusion that the scal
multipliers are large in the DEFK model would not be a¤ected if we assume
a stochastic exit for the liquidity-trap crisis rather than a deterministic exit.
Carlstrom et al. (2012) nd that the scal multiplier can be unboundedly
large in a liquidity-trap crisis with a stochastic exit because when the end
date of the crisis is uncertain, the value of the scal multiplier can be in-
ated by the low probability event of the pegged interest rate lasting for a
very long time. Although in reality it is hard to assess peoples expectations
on the probability distributions of shocks, our deterministic-exit assumption
can nevertheless provide a lower-bound estimate of the value of the scal
multiplier under a certain expected duration of the crisis. If we instead as-
sume a stochastic exit, the scal multipliers we obtain would have been even
larger.
3 Calibration
Most of the calibration in this paper is drawn from the estimations of SW,
except for the parameters related to liquidity frictions, which largely follow
DEFK. The calibrated values are summarised in Table 1. Two important
parameters related to the borrowing constraint () and the resaleability
constraint (t) jointly determine the amount of liquidity in the economy.
DEFK use US data for the period from 1952 to 2008 to obtain the steady-
state values of  and  at 0.185, meaning that entrepreneurs can sell up to
56% (= 1   0:8154) of their equity holdings in one year. We follow DEFK
in our calibration of  and . A similar calibration is used by Shi (2015).
Other parameters related to capital investment are {, ,  and . Con-
sistent with DEFK, we calibrate the i.i.d. opportunity to invest in each
quarter ({) to 0.05, which equals to a 19% (= 1   (1  0:05)4) chance to
invest in one year.12 The capital adjustment cost parameter () is set to
12As noted by DEFK, 5% is a conservative estimate of the investment opportunity in
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Structural parameters:
 0.99 Discount factor
 1.39 Relative risk aversion
 0.025 Depreciation rate
 0.36 Capital share
 1 Capital goods adjustment cost parameter
 1.92 Inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply
f 0.11 Price mark-up
! 0.11 Wage mark-up
p 0.65 Price Calvo probability
! 0.73 Wage Calvo probability
Parameters related to liquidity constraints:
{ 0.05 Probability of an investment opportunity
 0.185 Borrowing constraint at steady state
 0.185 Equity resaleability constraint at steady state
Policy parameters:
  2.03 Taylor-rule coe¢ cient on ination
 Y 0.08 Taylor-rule coe¢ cient on output
 Y 0.22 Taylor-rule coe¢ cient on change in output
R 0.81 Interest rate smoothing
G 0.80 Persistence of government spending
 0.80 Persistence of a tax shock
  0.1 Fiscal rule parameter
Table 1: Calibration
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1 as in DEFK.  and  take on the conventional values of 0.36 and 0.025
respectively.
For the parameters that are standard in a DSGE model such as  and ,
we assign values mainly by referring to the mode of the posterior estimates
obtained by SW. The Calvo probabilities for prices (p) and wages (w)
are 0.65 and 0.73 respectively. Following Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan
(2000), we assume the curvature parameters of the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregators
in goods and labour markets to be 10, meaning a markup of 0.11 in both
markets.
We also adopt the estimates of SW for the values of the parameters gov-
erning the conduct of monetary policy. For the scal rule parameter (  ),
we assign the value of 0:1 as in DEFK, implying that the adjustment of taxes
to the governments debt position is gradual. We follow Christiano, Eichen-
baum and Rebelo (2011) to set the persistence of government spending (G)
at 0.8. The persistence of a lump-sum tax cut ( ) is set at 0.8.
Two steady-state ratios are exogenous: the public debt-to-GDP ratio
(L=4Y ) and the government spending share in GDP (G=Y ). Following
DEFK, we set the former to 40%. The latter takes the average value of
government consumption share observed in the post-war United States of
18%. Ination is zero at the steady state.
4 How Large Is the Government Spending Multi-
plier?
In the literature, studies of the scal multiplier usually focus on the impact
multiplier which is dened as dYtdGt , where dYt and dGt are the respective
di¤erences of output and government spending from their steady state at
period t. As noted by Woodford (2011), this way of calculating the multi-
plier requires the output rise to follow the same shape of time path as that
the literature. We thus carried out numerical experiments to increase the value of { and
found that even a slight increase of { to 5.5% would cause the condition that qt > pIt not to
hold. Since such condition is crucial in deriving the rst order conditions of entrepreneurs,
we stick with DEFKs calibration to set { at 5%.
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of the government spending rise for the multiplier to be meaningful. We
recognise in our simulations that the e¤ects of scal stimulus on GDP are
often delayed, so the time paths of the two can di¤er from each other sub-
stantially. For this reason, we instead focus on the cumulative multiplier,
dened as
Et
1P
t=0
dYt
Et
1P
t=0
dGt
. If it is greater than one, it implies that any change in
government spending has a spillover e¤ect on GDP. We examine the value
of the multiplier in normal times and in times of crisis. We dene normal
timesas the cases where the economy is in the vicinity of the steady state.
Liquidity frictions are present in the DEFK model even in normal times
due to the borrowing and the resaleability constraints facing households.
As noted in the previous section, we follow DEFK in our calibration of the
liquidity-constraint parameters,  and , at steady state. Since DEFK cal-
ibrate these parameters using US data for the period from 1952 to 2008,
the amount of liquidity in our model in normal times reects the average
condition for that period.13 In the DEFK model, a liquidity crisis occurs
when the resaleability constraint on equity tightens, simulating the condition
when the nancial crisis started in 2008.
4.1 The Multiplier in Normal Times
We use the DEFK model to calculate the government spending multiplier
in normal times by giving the steady state a positive government spending
shock of 1% of GDP. Government spending follows an AR(1) process with
a persistence of 0.8. We obtain the cumulative multiplier on output at 1.61.
How does this result compare with that obtained using a standard New
Keynesian DSGE model? We carry out a control experiment by stripping all
liquidity-constraint features from the DEFK model.14 With the same gov-
13 In a speech in 2005, Alan Greenspan suggested that access to credit had become
unproblematic to the vast majority of households. Specically, he noted that [w]ith these
advances in technology, lenders have taken advantage of credit-scoring models and other
techniques for e¢ ciently extending credit to a broader spectrum of consumers.... The
period that Greenspan was referring to is the time just before 2005, when the subprime
bubble was forming. Arguably, that should not represent the liquidity in normal times.
14 In this standard DSGE model, investment opportunities are not scarce. Investing in
16
ernment spending shock, the model without liquidity frictions (henceforth
the standard model) predicts the cumulative multiplier on output to be
0.55. In Rows 2 - 4 of Table 2, we summarise the cumulative government
spending multipliers obtained using the two models in the normal-times
scenario.
Figure 1 reports the impulse-response functions (IRFs) of the key macro-
economic variables to a government spending shock. In the standard model,
both investment and consumption are crowded out and the increase in out-
put is moderate and short-lived. The IRFs generated by the DEFK model
are very di¤erent for some variables, especially investment. Following the
government spending shock, private investment falls slightly but then rises
in a hump-shaped manner after two quarters. The positive e¤ect on invest-
ment peaks around ten quarters after the shock and persists until thirty
quarters after the shock.15 Consumption shows a similar hump-shaped pat-
tern, rising above the steady state from the 10th quarter onwards. It returns
to its steady-state value only after about 80 periods from the shock. Ac-
cordingly, the increase in output in the DEFK model is larger and more
persistent. As consumption and investment decrease in both models upon
impact, the impact multipliers on output are not too di¤erent (0.70 in the
DEFK model vs. 0.58 in the standard model). However, the cumulative
multiplier on output obtained using the DEFK model (1.61) is almost three
times that obtained using the standard model (0.55).
Our impulse response analysis suggests that government spending ex-
pansion has positive spillover e¤ects on consumption and investment in the
DEFK model. We also compute the cumulative multipliers on consumption
and investment in both the standard and the DEFK models. These mul-
tipliers measure the expected cumulative increases in consumption and in-
vestment respectively, given a one-dollar cumulative increase in government
capital is not more protable than holding other assets. The investment function hence
reverts to a standard Euler equation. We use the calibration shown in Table 1 with the
exception of , which is adjusted to 0.9943 to keep the steady-state interest rate in line
with that in the DEFK model.
15Upon impact, investment decreases slightly because an increase in bond holdings in
period t only has an e¤ect on investment in t+ 1.
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Standard model DEFK model
1 Impact multiplier on output 0.58 0.70
Cumulative multiplier on:
2 Output 0.55 1.61
3 Consumption -0.35 0.27
4 Investment -0.11 0.39
Cumulative multiplier due to
liquidity e¤ect on:
5 Output - 0.89
6 Consumption - 0.54
7 Investment - 0.41
Cumulative multiplier on output:
8 (i) p;w = 0 0.09 0.90
9 (ii) w = 0 0.16 0.97
10 (iii) p = 0 0.51 1.59
Table 2: Government spending multipliers in the DEFK model and in the standard
model in normal times under di¤erent scenarios
Notes: Rows 1-7 report the multipliers in the baseline case: Row 1 reports
the impact multipliers on output. Rows 2-4 report the cumulative multipliers on
output, investment and consumption, while Rows 5-7 report the same only due to
the liquidity e¤ect. Rows 8-10 report the cumulative multipliers on output under
di¤erent degrees of nominal rigidities: fully exible prices and wages (Row 8);
sticky prices and exible wages (Row 9); and exible prices and sticky wages (Row
10).
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spending. As shown in Table 2, both the investment and the consumption
multipliers are positive in the DEFK model. In the standard model, both
of these multipliers are negative, so the cumulative multiplier on output is
smaller than one.
The consumption behaviour predicted by the DEFK model is in line with
the ndings of the empirical studies based on standard VAR, which typically
suggest that government spending crowds in consumption (see Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) and Gali, Lopez-Salido and Vallés (2007), among oth-
ers). On the other hand, empirical analyses that identify scal policy shocks
using war dates usually suggest that consumption falls in response to a gov-
ernment spending rise (see, for example, Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher
(2004) and Ramey (2011a, b)). Turning to the behaviour of investment,
empirical evidence tends to suggest that government spending crowds out
private investment. While Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) nd a
small, transitory increase in investment in response to a positive government
spending shock, Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Gali, Lopez-Salido and Val-
lés (2007) and Ramey (2011a, b) nd the opposite. The di¤erence between
our results obtained using the DEFK model and those of the empirical liter-
ature may be due to how scal expansion is nanced. The empirical studies
tend to focus on samples in which much of the spending was nanced by
distortionary tax increases, whereas in our paper, we focus on debt-nanced
expansion.
To understand why the DEFK model generates di¤erent results to the
standard models, let us rst consider the mechanism at work in the standard
model. In the standard model, while an increase in government spending
creates aggregate demand which increases in output, it also creates ina-
tion pressures, causing the central bank to tighten monetary policy. Both
investment and consumption are crowded out by the rising interest rate.
In addition, forward-looking households anticipate future tax increases and
react by reducing consumption. The negative wealth e¤ect induces workers
to work more, leading to increases in labour supply. However, the overall
increase in output is smaller than the increase in government spending.
The mechanism at work in the DEFK model is di¤erent from the one in
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the standard model in that an increase in government spending in the DEFK
model also a¤ects liquidity through an increase in the supply of government
bonds, which we dene as the liquidity e¤ectof scal expansion. In the
DEFK model, households are liquidity constrained in a way that entrepre-
neurs want to obtain funds to make protable investments but cannot. The
government, on the other hand, is not bound by liquidity constraints. As
the government issues a bond to a household to be repaid by higher taxes on
the household in the future, the government is in e¤ect borrowing on behalf
of the household at the risk-free interest rate. For this reason, a scal expan-
sion nanced mainly by bonds generates extra liquidity to the households.
The improvement in liquidity is reected in the reduction in the spread be-
tween liquid and illiquid assets, dened as Et

rkt+1+(1 )qt+1
qt
  Rtt+1

. Our
model shows that the quarterly spread reduces by 3 basis points following
the government spending expansion.
We carry out an experiment to isolate the liquidity e¤ect of the govern-
ment spending rise in the DEFK model. We consider the hypothetical case
where government spending does not use output, so that aggregate demand
is immune to any changes in government spending. Given the same amount
of government bonds issued as in the baseline case, we obtain the cumulative
multipliers solely due to the liquidity e¤ect, which are reported in Rows 5 -
7 of Table 2. Both the consumption and the investment multipliers due to
the liquidity e¤ect are positive, suggesting that consumption and investment
are crowded in by an improvement in liquidity. The intuition is as follows:
A government spending expansion in the DEFK model is nanced mainly
by public debt since tax adjustments are slow. As the government increases
their spending, higher real interest rates and future tax burdens cause house-
holds to increase their bond holdings, thus improving householdsliquidity
since government bonds are liquid. When an attractive investment oppor-
tunity arrives, rational entrepreneurs sell all their liquid assets to obtain
funds to invest in new capital. Investment therefore increases following the
government spending rise.16
16Following Shi (2015), DEFK assume that entrepreneurs and workers in a household
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The increase in investment has a knock-on e¤ect on consumption. The
fact that consumption becomes positive later than investment reinforces this
insight (see Figure 1). The intuition for the positive multiplier on consump-
tion is as follows. Due to intertemporal substitution e¤ects, rising interest
rates cause workers to respond to the government spending shock initially
by reducing consumption. As we assume that government spending follows
an AR(1) process, the increase in government spending dissipates over time.
As government spending falls, the real interest rate decreases. Workers then
gradually increase their consumption. As capital is still being produced,
reected by the persistently higher-than-usual level of investment, the de-
mand for labour is greater than steady state. A greater demand for labour
translates into higher real wages, allowing workers to increase consumption
spending. Indeed, as the IRFs show, consumption closely follows the dynam-
ics of real wages.
4.2 Key Determinants of the Size of the Multiplier
Due to the presence of liquidity constraints, Ricardian equivalence does not
hold in the DEFK model. Changes in taxes a¤ect householdsbehaviour so
the value of the multiplier should be sensitive to the scal rule. We carry
out sensitivity analysis on the scal rule parameter,   , which measures
how quickly the government increases taxes following bond issues. In the
baseline,   is set to 0.1 following DEFK to reect that a slow rise in taxes.
If we increase   to 1, the cumulative multiplier on output in the DEFK
model reduces to 0.67. This result indicates that the government should de-
lay increasing taxes to ensure e¤ective expansionary policy. We also test our
results by adopting one of the scal rules estimated by Leeper, Plante and
Traum (2010). Di¤erent from our scal rule, Leeper et al. (2010)s rule in-
pool their assets at the beginning of each period. When pooling is not allowed, as in KM
(2008), entrepreneurs and workers are separate entities and the opportunity for entrepre-
neurs to invest is scarce. In that version of the model, an increase in government borrowing
would increase the bond holdings of non-investing entrepreneurs. This would provide in-
vesting entrepreneurs with more liquidity when an investment opportunity arrives. There-
fore, even without the asset-pooling assumption, the DEFK model still suggests a large
multiplier e¤ect on investment.
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cludes output growth, which acts as an automatic stabiliserto the cyclical
position of the economy. Following Leeper et al. (2010), we calibrate the co-
e¢ cient of output growth in the rule at 0.13 and hold the coe¢ cient of debt
constant.17 The results suggest that the inclusion of the automatic stabiliser
in the rule does not a¤ect the value of the scal multiplier signicantly.
The stickiness of prices and wages also plays a role in generating a large
scal multiplier. Rows 8-10 of Table 2 present the cumulative multipliers
on output that we obtain with di¤erent degrees of nominal rigidities given
the same government spending shock. Row 8 (p;w = 0) shows the results
under fully exible prices and wages. Absent both price and wage stickiness,
the standard model gives a very low cumulative output multiplier of 0.09.
The DEFK model suggests a much larger multiplier (0.90), although it is
small compared to the baseline case (1.61). Row 9 (w = 0) shows the
results obtained with fully exible wages but sticky prices; whereas Row 10
(p = 0) shows those obtained with sticky wages and fully exible prices.
With price stickiness alone, the multipliers are not too di¤erent from those
obtained absent nominal rigidities (p;w = 0). With wage stickiness alone,
on the other hand, we are able to obtain multipliers similar to those in
the baseline case. These results suggest that, in the DEFK model, both
liquidity frictions and nominal rigidities play a key role in generating large
scal multipliers.
To understand the reasons why nominal rigidities can lead to larger
multipliers, we consider the IRFs of the key macroeconomic variables to
a government spending shock in the DEFK model under di¤erent degrees
of nominal rigidities (Figure 2). Let us rst discuss the case with fully
exible nominal prices and wages. Although nominal rigidities are absent,
government spending expansion leads to a negative wealth e¤ect, inducing
17Leeper, Plante and Traum (2010) estimate the scal rules for various taxes using US
quarterly data for the period from 1960 to 2008. Their estimation results imply that
in a scal rule in the form of equation (7), the coe¢ cient of government debt is 0.06
(compared to 0.1 in DEFKs calibration). This suggests that lump-sum taxes in reality
are less responsive to changes in the level of government debt. Calibrating the coe¢ cient of
government debt at 0.06 gives a larger multiplier but does not change our main conclusions.
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households to work more. Increased labour supply increases output, as
indicated by the positive responses of output. If only prices are sticky but
wages are exible, the multiplier is larger than without nominal rigidities
since the markup by rms becomes smaller. This is true because prices
respond sluggishly in response to the increase in marginal cost caused by an
increase in government spending. As noted by Christiano et al. (2011), a
reduced markup leads to an outward shift of the labour demand curve. This
increases employment and leads to a larger increase in output than in the
case without nominal rigidities. On the other hand, if only wages are sticky
but prices are fully exible, the multiplier is even larger than in the case
with price stickiness alone for the following reason. With wage stickiness
alone, although the markup is constant as prices adjust immediately in full
proportion to the increase in marginal cost, nominal wages do not increase
as much as they do in the case with exible wages. Muted wage responses
in response to an increase in government spending allow rms to hire more,
resulting in larger output rises. Indeed, as Figure 2 shows, real wages in the
case with wage stickiness alone are much lower than in the case with price
stickiness alone. The multiplier is largest in the case with both price and
wage stickiness compared to all other cases considered here, since a scal
expansion in this case results in a lower markup and also a higher labour
demand by rms due to the sluggish adjustments in nominal wages.
The results reported in Christiano et al. (2011) and Woodford (2011)
suggest that the government spending multiplier is smaller as the persistence
of government spending (G) increases. We repeat our experiments by in-
creasing G from 0.8 to 0.97, which is the estimate suggested by SW. The
cumulative multiplier on output in the DEFK model reduces to 1.04 in this
case, whereas the one in the standard model falls to only 0.27. The reason
for this result is that as the government spending rise is more persistent,
the present value of the associated tax rises also increases, causing larger
negative wealth impacts on consumption. The rise in output is therefore
much smaller, resulting in a much smaller government spending multiplier.
However, our conclusion that the multiplier is larger in the DEFK model
than in the standard model remains unchanged.
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We also carry out sensitivity analysis on the monetary policy rule. In-
stead of (8), we assume that the central bank follows a standard Taylor rule
with   = 1:5,  Y = 0:125 and no interest rate inertia. In this case, the
cumulative multiplier on output in the DEFK model is slightly higher at
1.8, whereas the one in the standard model (0.6) is almost the same as the
baseline. These results seem to conrm that the multiplier is larger in the
DEFK model regardless of the monetary policy rule.
4.3 The Multiplier in Times of Crisis
We now examine the value of the government spending multiplier in times
of crisis. In the DEFK model, a liquidity crisis occurs when the value of the
resaleability constraint parameter, t; falls by 60% from steady state. The
crisis brings about a liquidity trap. If the government decides to increase
spending during a crisis, we assume that it happens in the same period as the
arrival of the liquidity shock (t = 1). The cumulative government spending
multiplier on output in a crisis is obtained by
Et
1P
t=0
(dYt dY t )
Et
1P
t=0
dGt
, where dYt
denotes the change in output due to the combined e¤ects of the liquidity
shock and the government spending shock, and dY t denotes the same due
to the liquidity shock alone by holding Gt constant. The di¤erence between
the two measures the output change that is due to scal stimulus. The
multipliers on consumption and investment are calculated in the same way,
with Yt being replaced by Ct and It respectively.
Using the DEFK model, we simulate liquidity crises of various expected
durations, and compute the cumulative multipliers in response to a govern-
ment spending shock of 1% of GDP with G = 0:8.
18 This exercise cannot
18The size of the government spending shock is the same as that in the rst section of
Cogan et al. (2010). Erceg and Linde (2012) nd that the value of the multiplier can be
a¤ected by the size of the scal stimulus when the liquidity trap is endogenous. The larger
is the scal stimulus, the faster the economy exits the liquidity trap, causing a smaller
multiplier. We test our results by increasing the size of the shock to 2% of GDP. We
nd that in normal times, the multipliers are una¤ected; in times of crisis, the multipliers
decrease only slightly (by around 0.1 on average).
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Duration of Duration of Cumulative multipliers on:
crisis liquidity trap Output Consumption Investment
1q 1q 2.00 0.68 0.32
4q 3q 2.09 0.78 0.32
8q 6q 2.17 0.86 0.32
12q 10q 2.22 0.91 0.34
16q 14q 2.27 0.95 0.34
20q 18q 2.28 0.97 0.34
Table 3: Government spending multipliers on output, consumption and investment
in times of crisis in the DEFK model
be carried out using the standard model as it does not allow for nancial
frictions. Table 3 shows the cumulative multipliers and the number of pe-
riods in which the nominal interest rate falls to zero. Our results suggest
that the longer is the liquidity crisis, the longer the liquidity trap is. In
addition, the longer is the liquidity trap, the larger the scal multiplier is.
The DEFK model implies the value of the cumulative multiplier on output
ranges between 2.00 and 2.28 in the crisis state, which is much higher than
that in normal times.
To determine the cause of a larger multiplier in the crisis state, we re-
port in Figures 3 and 4 the IRFs to a liquidity shock that is expected to
last for three years, for the cases with and without government spending ex-
pansion.19 We rst discuss the case without scal expansion. The liquidity
shock leads to a large decrease in the resaleability of equity, so that entrepre-
neurs can obtain fewer funds for investment by selling their equity. Figure 3
shows that the fall in investment at t = 1 is as large as 19%. This substan-
tial fall in investment seems to suggest that in the DEFK model, most new
investment is nanced by the sales of entrepreneursasset holdings, rather
than the issues of new equity. Consumption, output and employment fall
by signicant amounts upon impact. Both output and consumption fall by
around 10%, while labour hours fall by around 15%.20 Reecting the ight
19Note that the IRFs are not smooth in this case. Most of the lines bend upwards after
12 quarters from the shock, when the economy is expected to exit from the crisis.
20The fall in economic activity we obtain here is more severe than that suggested by
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to liquidity, householdsbond holdings increase by around 4% and continue
to rise in a hump-shaped manner. The nominal interest rate falls to its
zero lower bound in response to the liquidity shock and remains zero-bound
for ten quarters. Ination decreases by 3.7 percentage points, and because
of the zero-bound nominal interest rate, the real interest rate increases by
around 2 percentage points.
We now consider the case with government spending expansion. Similar
to the case in normal times, the increases in public demand and liquidity
lead to an increase in aggregate demand. As a result, ination falls by less.
Given the zero-bound nominal interest rate, the real interest rate increases
by less relative to the case without scal stimulus, leading to smaller falls
in consumption and hence in output. A natural question arises: why is the
scal multiplier larger in the crisis state than in normal times? The rea-
son is that the multiplier e¤ect on consumption is larger at the zero lower
bound. To conrm this, we also report in Table 3 the cumulative multipliers
on consumption and investment in crisis times. Indeed, the consumption
multiplier is larger than that in normal times and increases substantially as
the liquidity trap lengthens, whereas the investment multiplier is similar to
that in normal times (see Table 2). The positive responses of consumption
and investment are consistent with the empirical ndings reported by Auer-
bach and Gorodnichenko (2012), who show that scal expansion crowds in
consumption and investment during recessions.
To gain an insight into the role that liquidity constraints play in gener-
ating large scal multipliers in crisis times, we also calculate the cumulative
government spending multipliers on consumption, investment and output in
the zero-bound state using the standard model. Since nancial frictions are
absent in the standard model, we cannot simulate a liquidity crisis in the
same way as we do with the DEFK model. Instead, we follow Cogan et
al. (2010) to assume that the nominal interest rate in the standard model
DEFK. In DEFK, the government carries out quantitative easing in a liquidity crisis by
buying private assets and selling government bonds in the open market. Such policy
improves liquidity in the economy and helps alleviate the adverse e¤ects of a liquidity
shock. In this paper, we focus our study on the e¤ectiveness of scal policy. Therefore, to
simplify our model, we assume that no quantitative easing is carried out in a crisis.
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Duration of Cumulative multipliers on:
liquidity trap Output Consumption Investment
1q 1.65 0.47 0.18
4q 1.84 0.61 0.23
8q 1.66 0.48 0.18
12q 1.42 0.30 0.12
16q 1.24 0.17 0.08
20q 1.13 0.09 0.05
Table 4: Government spending multipliers on output, consumption and investment
in the standard model with an imposed zero bound
remains constant at its steady-state value for various durations. The results
are reported in Table 4.
The government spending multiplier is still larger in the DEFK model
than that in the standard model when the nominal interest rate is con-
stant due to the larger multipliers on both consumption and investment.
In the standard model, the value of the output multiplier is driven mainly
by the multiplier on consumption. The investment multiplier is very small.
In addition, as the crisis prolongs, the output multiplier in the standard
model increases in a hump-shaped manner, reaching its peak when the zero-
bound state lasts for one year. This nding is related to the observation by
Christiano et al. (2011) and Woodford (2011), who suggest that the scal
multiplier is largest if the scal expansion lasts exactly as long as the zero-
bound state. Since we assume that government spending evolves according
to an AR(1) process with a persistence parameter of 0.8, the majority of
the public spending rises in our model occurs within the rst four quarters
after the shock. The government spending multiplier is largest when the
zero-bound state lasts for a similar duration. As the liquidity trap length-
ens, the scal stimulus becomes less e¤ective and the value of the multiplier
decreases.
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4.4 A More Realistic Path of Government Spending
Thus far, we have assumed that government spending follows an AR(1)
process. While such a process is useful for understanding the possible e¤ects
of scal expansion on the economy, the path of government purchases under
this assumption is inconsistent with the actual one implied by the 2009
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). We plot in Figure 5a
the actual increase in government purchases as a share of GDP under the
ARRA. While the AR(1) process suggests a large, immediate increase in
government spending that dissipates over time, the increase in government
purchases under the ARRA is more gradual and reaches its peak only after
about a year.
To obtain the path of government purchases under the ARRA, we follow
the same approach as in Cogan et al. (2010). Specically, on top of the
increase in federal purchases, we add 60% of the increase in transfers to
states and localities. Following Romer and Bernstein (2009), Cogan et al.
(2010) assume that 60% of intergovernmental transfers result in purchases
of goods and services. We then divide the resulting sum by the actual US
GDP data.21
We recalculate the scal multipliers in crisis times under this more realis-
tic path of government purchases as implied by the ARRA, holding all other
assumptions the same as in the previous subsection. The cumulative multi-
pliers on output obtained in this case are almost the same as those under the
assumption of an AR(1) process for the government spending shock. The
output multiplier for a 3-year crisis obtained in this case is 2.34, compared to
2.22 under the AR(1) government spending shock (Table 3). Therefore, our
conclusion that the multiplier is large in a liquidity crisis still holds. We also
report in Figure 5b. the impulse-responses of output in a 3-year crisis with
and without scal stimulus. As it is evident from the gure, without scal
stimulus the fall in output would have been larger by around 1 percentage
point at the early stage of the crisis, suggesting that the scal interventions
21The ARRA data is available at: http://www.bea.gov/recovery/pdf/arra-table.pdf.
Total government purchases are obtained by adding 60% times the numbers in row 18 to
those in row 6 of the table.
28
in the US during the recent nancial crisis could have saved the economy
from a deeper recession.
5 The Tax Multiplier
What if the government instead chose to stimulate growth by cutting taxes?
In this section, we study the policy multiplier for a temporary cut in taxes
with the DEFK model. We assume a lump-sum tax cut of 1% of GDP,
which follows an AR(1) process with a persistence of 0.8. The cumulative
tax multiplier, dened as the expected cumulative increase in output given
a one-dollar cumulative cut in taxes, or
Et
1P
t=0
dYt
 Et
1P
t=0
d t
, is obtained using the
DEFK model. The multiplier we obtain in normal times is 0.84, while the
one in a 3-year crisis is 1.41. The tax multiplier in the standard model, by
contrast, is zero due to Ricardian equivalence. A tax cut in the DEFK model
works mainly through the same liquidity e¤ect as for a government spending
expansion: a fall in tax revenue causes the government to issue more bonds,
thereby increasing the proportion of liquid assets in householdsportfolios.
Improvement in liquidity increases investment, consumption and output.
The reason why the tax multiplier is larger in crisis times than in normal
times is the same as that for the case with government spending: an increase
in economic activity due to liquidity improvement reduces deation in a
nancial crisis. As the nominal interest rate is zero-bound, it causes a fall
in the real interest rate and hence promotes consumption. To demonstrate
the role of the liquidity e¤ect in stimulating output after a tax cut, we
also obtain the tax multipliers in the DEFK model by holding the amount
of government bonds constant following the tax cut. In this case, the tax
multiplier in normal times falls to almost zero, while the one in a 3-year
crisis falls to only 0.26.
A comparison of the tax multiplier and the government spending mul-
tiplier suggests that government spending expansion is more e¤ective in
stimulating output. In the DEFK model, a government spending expansion
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works by increasing liquidity and creating aggregate demand. A tax cut, on
the other hand, resembles a lump-sum transfer to households. While it re-
laxes householdsliquidity constraints, it does not create aggregate demand
directly.22 Nevertheless, the tax multipliers that we obtain using the DEFK
model are still much larger than those suggested by the standard model with
frictionless nancial markets.
6 Does the Initial Debt-to-GDP Ratio Matter?
Following DEFK, we calibrate the steady-state government debt-to-GDP
ratio at 0.4. In this section, we perform a sensitivity analysis to see how
the size of the scal multiplier depends on the steady-state debt-to-GDP
ratio.23 Figures 6a. and 6b. report the results from our analysis. Figure
6a. shows the value of the government spending multiplier as a function
of the initial debt-to-output ratio under three scenarios: (a) during normal
times, (b) during a 12-quarter liquidity crisis but without a zero lower bound
(ZLB), and (c) during a 12-quarter liquidity crisis and with a ZLB. Figure
6b. reports the same for the tax multiplier. This exercise also helps us
quantify how the spending and the tax multipliers depend on a liquidity
crisis and a ZLB separately.
The results reported in Figures 6a. and 6b. suggest that the size of
the multiplier is sensitive to the initial debt-to-GDP ratio. In both normal
times and crisis times, the government spending multiplier becomes smaller
as the initial debt-to-GDP ratio increases. The intuition of this result is
that with a higher debt-to-GDP ratio at steady state, liquidity is more
abundant to start with. The improvement of liquidity resulted from a scal
expansion would therefore have smaller stimulative e¤ects on output. During
a liquidity crisis, the scal multiplier without a ZLB is smaller than that
with a ZLB, but still larger than that in normal times, implying that both
22Using a standard DSGE model, Eggertsson (2011) also nds that scal policies that
aim directly at stimulating aggregate demand are more e¤ective.
23When changing the initial debt-to-GDP ratio, we adjust the value of beta to make
sure that the steady-state interest rate falls within a reasonable range.
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the presence of a ZLB and the deterioration of liquidity contribute to the
larger multiplier in a crisis. Our results further suggest that, if the initial
debt ratio is low (e.g. 0.2), the ZLB constraint will cause the multiplier
to increase by more in a crisis than in the case with a high initial debt
ratio. When the initial debt-to-GDP ratio is higher at 0.6, the e¤ect of the
ZLB on the size of the multiplier is smaller, probably because of the higher
steady-state liquidity in that case. Figure 6b. shows that the main results
for the government spending multiplier also hold for the tax multiplier. A
comparison of Figures 6a. and 6b. shows that the multiplier resulting from
an increase in government spending is larger than that from a tax cut,
conrming our earlier ndings.
Our results in this section have an important policy implication. Given
the nding that scal policy becomes less e¤ective with a higher initial debt-
to-GDP ratio, policymakers may strive to keep the debt-to-GDP ratio low
in normal times and use scal stimulus only in times of crisis in order to
maximise the stimulative e¤ects on output.
7 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we have extended the DEFK model by introducing a role
for government spending. We use the resulting model to study the e¤ects
of scal policy shocks on the macroeconomy. The DEFK model accounts
for liquidity constraints and generates a liquidity-trap crisis when the as-
set resaleability constraint tightens. Our main nding is that government
spending expansion can be highly e¤ective in an economic environment in
which government bonds are liquid and private nancial assets are only
partially liquid. In this model, a bond-nanced scal expansion increases
the proportion of liquid assets in the private-sector wealth through an in-
crease in the supply of government bonds. An improvement in liquidity has
positive e¤ects on private investment, consumption and output, therefore
generating a large scal multiplier. Furthermore, using the DEFK model,
we nd that the tax multiplier is positive but smaller than the government
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spending multiplier since a lump-sum tax cut improves the private-sector
liquidity but does not directly create aggregate demand.
We also study the e¤ectiveness of scal stimulus in a liquidity crisis. In
the DEFK model, a negative shock to liquidity reduces the resaleability of
private assets and brings about a liquidity trap. As the multiplier e¤ect on
consumption is larger when the nominal interest rate is bound at zero, the
scal multiplier we obtain is even larger than that in normal times. This re-
sult is consistent with previous research ndings which suggest that, relative
to the case without scal expansion, an increase in public demand at the
zero lower bound pushes up prices, lowers the real interest rate and stim-
ulates consumption (see, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo
(2011)).
Using the DEFK model in crisis mode, we also study the e¤ects on
output of the scal interventions under the 2009 American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The scal multiplier is large upon a shock that
simulates the path of government purchases increase under the ARRA, sug-
gesting that the scal interventions by the US government during the recent
crisis may have prevented a deeper recession. This nding may explain why
the economic downturn during the Great Recession was less severe in the
US than in countries such as Germany and Sweden, where the government
strived to contain their decits and to keep their debt-to-GDP ratio con-
stant. In 2009, the fall in GDP relative to the previous year was around 3%
in the US, while in Germany and Sweden, the falls were larger at around
5%.
Finally, we nd that the e¤ectiveness of scal policy is sensitive to the
steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio. Fiscal stimulus becomes less e¤ective as the
initial debt-to-GDP ratio increases. This nding has an important policy
implication: Governments may want to contain the public debt ratio in
normal times to obtain more e¤ective results from scal stimulus during
deep recessions, when the stimulative e¤ects are most needed.
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Figure 1: IRFs to a government spending shock in normal times: the DEFK model
vs. the standard model
Notes: The dotted lines show the IRFs generated by the standard model, while the
solid lines show the ones generated by the DEFK model.
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Figure 2: IRFs to a government spending shock in the DEFK model under di¤erent
degrees of nominal rigidities
Notes: The crossed lines show the IRFs when both prices and wages are
fully exible, while the dotted lines show the ones when both of them are sticky.
The lines with triangles show the IRFs with wage stickiness alone, while the solid
lines show the IRFs with price stickiness alone.
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Figure 3: IRFs to a three-year liquidity crisis in the DEFK model: E¤ects of scal
stimulus
Notes: The solid lines show the IRFs to a three-year crisis in the DEFK
model without scal stimulus, while the dotted lines show the ones with scal
stimulus.
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Figure 4: IRFs to a three-year liquidity crisis in the DEFK model: E¤ects of scal
stimulus
Notes: The solid lines show the IRFs to a three-year crisis in the DEFK
model without scal stimulus, while the dotted lines show the ones with scal
stimulus.
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Notes: The solid line in panel b. shows the output response in the DEFK
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with scal stimulus under the ARRA.
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Figure 6: The sensitivity of the government spending multiplier and the tax
multiplier to the initial debt-to-output ratio
Notes: The lines show the values of the multipliers under three di¤erent
scenarios: (a) during normal times, (b) during a 3-year crisis (but without a ZLB),
and (c) during a 3-year crisis and with a ZLB.
38
References
[1] Adjemian, Stéphane, Houtan Bastani, Michel Juillard, Frédéric
Karamé, Ferhat Mihoubi, George Perendia, Johannes Pfeifer, Marco
Ratto and Sébastien Villemot, 2011. Dynare: Reference Manual, Ver-
sion 4,Dynare Working Paper 1, CEPREMAP
[2] Aiyagari, S. Rao and McGrattan, Ellen R., 1998. The optimum quan-
tity of debt," Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 42(3), pages 447-
469.
[3] Ajello, Andrea, 2010. Financial intermediation, investment dynamics
and business cycle uctuations,MPRA Paper 32447, University Li-
brary of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2011.
[4] Auerbach, Alan and Yuriy Gorodnichenko, 2012. Measuring the Out-
put Responses to Fiscal Policy, American Economic Journal: Eco-
nomic Policy, 4(2), pages 1-27.
[5] Bernanke, Ben, Mark Gertler and Simon Gilchrist, 1999. The nancial
accelerator in a quantitative business cycle framework," Handbook of
Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor and M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of
Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 21, pages 1341-1393.
[6] Bilbiie, Florin, Tommaso Monacelli and Roberto Perotti, 2013. Public
Debt and Redistribution with Borrowing Constraints,The Economic
Journal, 123, F64 - F98.
[7] Bilbiie, Florin, Tommaso Monacelli and Roberto Perotti, 2014. Is Gov-
ernment Spending at the Zero Lower Bound Desirable?," NBER Work-
ing Paper 20687.
[8] Blanchard, Olivier and Roberto Perotti, 2002. An Empirical Charac-
terization of the Dynamic E¤ects of Changes in Government Spend-
ing and Taxes on Output," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.
117(4), pages 1329-1368.
39
[9] Burnside, Craig, Eichenbaum, Martin and Fisher, Jonas D. M., 2004.
Fiscal shocks and their consequences,Journal of Economic Theory,
vol. 115(1), pages 89-117.
[10] Calvo, Guillermo, 1983. Staggered Prices and in a Utility-Maximizing
Framework,Journal of Monetary Economics, 12(3): 383-98.
[11] Carlstrom, Charles T., Timothy S. Fuerst and Matthias Paustian, 2012.
Fiscal Multipliers under an Interest Rate Peg of Deterministic vs. Sto-
chastic Duration,Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Working Paper
1235.
[12] Carrillo, Julio and Celine Poilly, 2013. How do nancial frictions a¤ect
the spending multiplier during a liquidity trap?" Review of Economic
Dynamics, vol. 16(2), pages 296-311.
[13] Chari, V. V., Patrick J. Kehoe and Ellen R. McGrattan, 2000. Sticky
Price Models of the Business Cycle: Can the Contract Multiplier Solve
the Persistence Problem?Econometrica, vol. 68(5), pages 1151-1180.
[14] Chari, V. V., Patrick J. Kehoe and Ellen R. McGrattan, 2009. New
Keynesian Models: Not Yet Useful for Policy Analysis,American Eco-
nomic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 1(1), pages 242-66.
[15] Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum and Charles L. Evans, 2005.
Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic E¤ects of a Shock to Monetary
Policy,Journal of Political Economy, vol. 113(1): 1-45.
[16] Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum and Sergio Rebelo, 2011.
When Is the Government Spending Multiplier Large?Journal of Po-
litical Economy, vol. 119(1): 78 - 121.
[17] Cogan, John F., Tobias Cwik, John B. Taylor and Volker Wieland,
2010. New Keynesian versus old Keynesian government spending mul-
tipliers,Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Volume 34, Issue
3: 281-295.
40
[18] Del Negro, Marco, Gauti Eggertsson, Andrea Ferrero and Nobuhiro
Kiyotaki, 2011. The Great Escape? A Quantitative Evaluation of the
Feds Liquidity Facilities,FRB of New York Sta¤ Report No. 520.
[19] Dixit, Avinash K. and Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1977. Monopolistic Compe-
tition and Optimum Product Diversity,American Economic Review,
vol. 67(3), pages 297-308.
[20] Dri¢ ll, John and Marcus Miller, 2011. Liquidity when it matters: QE
and Tobins q,CAGE Online Working Paper Series 67, Competitive
Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
[21] Eggertsson, Gauti B., 2011. What Fiscal Policy Is E¤ective at Zero
Interest Rates?NBER Macroeconomic Annual 2010, Volume 25: 59 -
112.
[22] Eggertsson, Gauti B. and Paul Krugman, 2012. Debt, Deleveraging,
and the Liquidity Trap: A Fisher-Minsky-Koo Approach,The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(3), pages
1469-1513.
[23] Erceg, Christopher, Dale Henderson and Andrew Levin, 2000. Optimal
monetary policy with staggered wage and price contracts," Journal of
Monetary Economics, vol. 46(2), pages 281-313.
[24] Erceg, Christopher and Jesper Linde, 2012. Is there a scal free lunch
in a liquidity trap?International Finance Discussion Paper No. 1003r.
[25] Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus. 2010. Fiscal Policy in a Model with Fi-
nancial Frictions," American Economic Review, 100(2): 35-40.
[26] Gali, Jordi, D. Lopez-Salido and J. Valles, 2007. Understanding the
e¤ects of government spending on consumption,Journal of the Euro-
pean Economic Association, vol. 5, pp. 227270.
[27] Hall, Robert E., 2009. By How Much Does GDP Rise If the Govern-
ment Buys More Output?Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:
183231.
41
[28] Holmstrom, Bengt and Jean Tirole, 1998. Private and Public Supply
of Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, 106 (1): 1-40.
[29] Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro and John Moore, 2008. Liquidity, Business Cycles,
and Monetary Policy,Mimeo, Princeton University.
[30] Krishnamurthy, Arvind and Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette, (2012). The
Aggregate Demand for Treasury Debt,Journal of Political Economy,
120, issue 2, pages 233 - 267.
[31] Leeper, Eric M., Michael Plante, and Nora Traum, 2010. Dynamics
of scal nancing in the United States," Journal of Econometrics, vol.
156(2), pages 304-321.
[32] Mertens, Karel and Morten O. Ravn, 2010. Fiscal Policy in an Expec-
tations Driven Liquidity Trap,CEPR Discussion Paper 7931.
[33] Ramey, Valerie, 2011a. Identifying Government Spending Shocks: Its
all in the Timing,The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 126(1),
pages 1-50.
[34] Ramey, Valerie, 2011b. Can Government Purchases Stimulate the
Economy?Journal of Economic Literature, 49(3): 673-85.
[35] Romer, C. and Bernstein, J. 2009. The job impact of the American
recovery and reinvestment plan, January 2009.
[36] Shi, Shouyong, 2015. Liquidity, Assets and Business Cycles,Journal
of Monetary Economics, 70: 116-132.
[37] Smets, Frank and Rafael Wouters, 2007. Shocks and Frictions in US
Business Cycles: A Bayesian DSGE Approach,American Economic
Review, vol. 97(3), pages 586-606.
[38] Taylor, John B., 1993. Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice,
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 39: 195-214.
[39] Woodford, Michael, 1990. Public Debt as Private Liquidity," American
Economic Review, vol. 80(2), pages 382-88.
42
[40] Woodford, Michael, 2011. Simple Analytics of the Government Expen-
diture Multiplier,American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol.
3(1), pages 1-35.
43
A Appendix (not intended for publication)
A.1 Other Equilibrium Equations of the DEFK Model
Di¤erentiated workers j 2 [{; 1] supply labour Ht (j) to the production sec-
tor through the arrangement of employment agencies as in Erceg, Henderson
and Levin (2000). Competitive employment agencies choose their prot-
maximising amount of Ht (j) to hire, taking nominal wages Wt (j) as given.
They combine Ht (j) into homogeneous units of labour input according to
Ht =

1
1 {
 !
1+!
R 1
{ Ht (j)
1
1+! dj
1+!
. The demand for type-j labour is
therefore Ht (j) = 11 {
h
Wt(j)
Wt
i  1+!!
Ht, where !  0 and Wt is the aggre-
gate wage index. Each type-j labour is represented by a labour union who
sets their nominal wage Wt (j) optimally on a staggered basis. Each period,
there is a history-independent probability of (1  !) for a union to reset
their wage. Otherwise, they keep their nominal wage constant. The optimal
wage-setting equation in real terms is:
Et
1P
s=t
(!)
s tC s
8>>><>>>:
ewt
t;s
  (1 + !)

1
1 {
 ewt
t;sws
  1+!
! Hs
v
C s
9>>>=>>>;
 ewt
t;sws
  1+!
!
Hs = 0,
(9)
where ewt (j)  fWt(j)Pt is the optimal wage chosen by a labour union at t,
wt  WtPt and t;s 
(
1, for s = t
t+1t+2:::s, for s  t+ 1
. The dynamics of wt
follows:
w
  1
!
t = (1  !) ew  1!t + ! wt 1t
  1!
(10)
Final-goods rms produce homogeneous nal goods Yt by combining het-
erogeneous intermediate goods Yt (i) according to Yt =
R 1
0 Yt (i)
1
1+f di
1+f
,
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where f  0. Their prot-maximising condition implies that the demand
for type-i intermediate good is Yt (i) =
h
Pt(i)
Pt
i  1+ff
Yt, where Pt (i) and Pt
are the respective nominal prices for intermediate and nal goods. Monop-
olistic competitive intermediate-goods rms produce according to the pro-
duction function Yt (i) = AtKt(i)Ht(i)1  , where At is productivity and
 is the capital share. Intermediate-goods rms maximise their real prots
Dt (i) by choosing the optimal capital and labour inputs, taking real wage
and rental rate of capital as given. The cost-minimising conditions imply
that their real marginal cost is:
mct = mct (i) =
1
At

wt
1  
1  rkt


, (11)
which is universal across rms. Intermediate-goods rms also set nominal
prices for their heterogeneous goods. In each period, each rm has a constant
probability of
 
1  p

to reset their price. They keep their price unchanged
otherwise. Firms who reset their price choose the one that maximises their
expected future prots, giving the price-setting equation (in real terms):
Et
1P
s=t
 
p
s t
C s
 ept
t;s
  (1 + f )mcs
 ept
t;s
  1+ff
Ys = 0, (12)
where ept (i)  ePt(i)Pt as the optimal price chosen at t. The zero-prot condi-
tion for nal-goods rms give rise to the evolution of ination:
1 =
 
1  p
 ept  1f + p 1t
  1
f
(13)
Capital-goods rms convert nal goods into capital goods. The ad-
justment cost is quadratic in aggregate investment in a way that S( ItI ) =

2
 
It
I   1
2
, where I is the steady-state investment and  > 0 is the ad-
justment cost parameter. Capital-goods rms choose the amount of It to
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produce which maximises their prots. The rst-order condition is:
pIt = 1 + S() + S0()
It
I
(14)
Upon aggregation, the market clears for both labour and capital so that
Ht =
R 1
0 Ht(i)di and Kt 1 =
R 1
0 Kt(i)di. The capital-labour ratio is:
Kt 1
Ht
=

(1  )
wt
rkt
, (15)
Capital evolves according to:
Kt = (1  )Kt 1 + It (16)
and the aggregate production function is:
AtKt 1Ht1  =
Z 1
0
Yt(i)di (17)
Capital is owned by households through their private equity holdings:
Kt = Nt (18)
The prots for intermediate-goods and capital-goods rms are wholly dis-
tributed to households as dividends. Substituting for Dt and DKt , (3) be-
comes:
It = {

rkt + (1  ) qtt

Nt 1 + rt 1Lt 1 + Yt   wtHt   rktKt 1 + pIt It   [1 + S()] It    t
pIt   qt
(19)
Finally, the resource constraint of the economy requires that:
Yt = Ct + [1 + S()] It +Gt (20)
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